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BACKGROUND 
Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder sentenced to death while represented by a 
lawyer without co-counsel, who only a few years earlier had graduated law school, and who had 
no experience whatsoever in capital litigation, filed his fourth post-conviction petitions in district 
court in 2002. This appeal is from the district court's denial of that petition in which Petitioner 
sought relief based on a host of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and prosecutorial 
misconduct claims. No court has ever considered the merits of any of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in this case, nor has any court considered the merits of any of the particular claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct raised in Petitioner's 2002 post-conviction petition 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN APPLYING IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S 
POST-CONVICTION ACTION, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE 
FEDERAL AND IDAHO CONSTITUTIONS' PROHIBITIONS AGAINST EX 
POST FACT0 LAWS. 
Respondent argues by way of a syllogism that it is not possible that Idaho Code Section 
19-2719 violates the expost facto prohibition: 
1. Procedural changes cannot run afoul of the federal and state expostfacto 
prohibitions. 
2. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 is procedural in nature. 
3. Therefore, Section 19-2719 cannot run afoul of the federal and state ex 
post facto prohibitions. 
As a matter of logic alone, this syllogism is unassailable. Add reality to the assessment, 
however, and the syllogism fails because it does not account for those procedural changes which 
effect substantive consequences, thereby rendering the procedural change itself an ex post facto 
violation. Thus, while it is true that the Supreme Court has written, "no ex post facto violation 
occurs if the change effected is merely procedural," Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,31 n. 12 
(1980), some procedural changes are not merely procedural and, therefore, may violate the ex 
post facto prohibition. 
The United States Supreme Court has held since 1925 that there may be procedural 
changes which violate the prohibition against expostfacto laws. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 
170-71 (1925). As that court recently reminded, Beazell went on to note that "the question of 
what legislative adjustments 'will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the 
constitutional prohibition' must be a matter of 'degree."' [Id. at] 171." California v. Morales, 
514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995). The Morales court articulated a test to determine whether a particular 
amendment is of "sufficient moment" to violate the expostfacto prohibition: 
In evaluating the 1981 amendment, we must determine whether it produces a 
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered 
crimes. We have previously declined to articulate a single "formula" for 
identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive 
crimes or punishment to fall within the constitutional prohibition, . . . and we have 
no occasion to do so here. 
Id (footnote and citation omitted). More recently, the United States Supreme Court confronted 
just such a change in Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000). There, the change considered was 
an increased interval between parole reconsiderations. Whether this clearly procedural change 
effected a substantive change which violated the ex post facto prohibition depends, the Court 
held, on whether the change "create[d] a significant risk" of making the punishment more 
burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration. 
Applying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Petitioner's case would unquestionably create a 
significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act ("UPCPA") were applied. For while those statutory sections contemplate barring 
claims not raised within 42 days of the filing of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental 
state in relation to those claims and their waiver, under the UPCPA a petitioner's delay in 
asserting claims may be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived the claims. I.C. 619-4808. As this Court has held: 
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or 
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time 
frame. This is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. I.C. 919-4908. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Because the Section 19- 
4908 hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more 
likely that the Court would reach the merits of Petitioner's claims if he were required to clear the 
former and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in 
enacting Section 19-2719, as is clear from the contrast between the statute and Section 19-4908, 
McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. I.C. 919-2719 ("The 
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating 
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Petitioner's 
claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of his claims show that Petitioner would 
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence andlor vacation of his 
conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of 
punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expostfacto clause, the facts 
of the instant case compel it. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more 
burdensome penalty than life, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US.  399,411 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
("execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . .death is different."), 
applying Section 19-2719 to block a merits review of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims constitutes an expost facto violation. 
Respondent argues that Petitioner "cannot complain of a lack of fair notice or prejudice" 
because, before his first post-conviction petition was filed, this Court "expressly advised [him] 
that his post-conviction proceedings would be governed by the dictates of I.C. 3 19-2719." Brief 
at 34. But the essence of the expostfacto clause is that it prohibits "enactments which, by 
retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its commission. Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,42 (1990) (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925))." 
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. at 249-50. Thus, contrary to Respondent's assertion, Petitioner can 
and does complain of lack of fair notice and prejudice. 
By applying the procedural bars of Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(3) & (5) to Petitioner's 
case, the court below violated Petitioner's state and federal constitutional rights against expost 
facto laws. U.S.Const. art I, 310, cl. 1; Idaho Const. art 1, 5 16. 
11. EVEN IF APPLYING IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 TO THIS CASE DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE STATE AND FEDERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST EX 
POST FACT0 LAWS, SECTION 19-2719(5)'s UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS 
NO APPLICATION HERE. 
A. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province, 
In Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of 
Powers Requirement. 
Noting that the Court has declared that the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus" and that the legislature "may add to the efficacy of the writ," Respondent asserts 
that "it naturally follows that I.C. $19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's 
jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." Brief at 38. Missing from 
Respondent's argument is any authority or other reason to think that Section 19-2719 in fact does 
add to the efficacy of the writ. Removing from the courts jurisdiction to hear writs does not 
increase the effectiveness of the writ. Rather, it invades the power of the judiciary in violation of 
the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
The sole case relied on for the opposite conclusion by the Respondent and the court 
below is Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 11 15 (Idaho 2000). 
But Kirkland is inapposite inasmuch as it nowhere addressed the interplay between the 
legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any constitutional rights vested in 
plaintiffs. By stark contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally guaranteed the right to seek a writ of 
habeas corpus and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought only through the 
vehicle of a post-conviction petition. This means that the legislature's prerogative to limit 
remedies in the post-conviction context is not without constraint. Rather, the limits may not 
suspend the writ. The fact that district courts did reach the merits of habeas claims filed outside 
the Section 19-2719 time restrictions, demonstrates that the statute suspends the writ in violation 
of the constitutional guarantee. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 229-30, 392 P.2d 279 
(Idaho1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas petition brought ten years 
after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining purpose in enacting 
Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its chosen means violated the separation of powers 
constitutional requirement. 
B. Idaho Code Section 19-2519 Violates Petitioner's Rights To 
Due Process And Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The 
United States And Idaho Constitutions 
Applying Section 19-27 19 to Petitioner denied him his fundamental right to fairness in 
proceedings concerning criminal convictions. The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from infringing fundamental rights unless "'narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest."' Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997) 
(quoting Reno v. Flares, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Similarly, the equal protection guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from either classifying people or applying laws such 
that only some individuals may exercise a fundamental right, unless the classification or 
application is narrowly tailored to serve some compelling state interest. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (when law interferes with a fundamental 
right, it triggers strict scrutiny review); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) ("whateve1 
. . . the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied . . . with a mind so unequal and 
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the laws 
which is secured . . . by the . . . [Flourteenth [A]mendment[.]"). Section 19-2719 is not narrowly 
tailored to serve any compelling state interest 
111. IDAHO COURTS SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF PETITIONER'S 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT CLAIMS. 
A. Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of Petitioner's 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Because Petitioner 
Was Represented By The Same Lawyer From Trial, On Direct 
Appeal, Through His First Post-Conviction Petition And Appeal, 
And On His Second Post-Conviction Petition And Appeals Until 
1995. 
This Court uniformly and strictly construes Idaho Code Section 19-271 9 to provide that 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are waived if not filed as part of the 
original post-conviction petition. The reason for this, the Court has repeatedly explained, is that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should reasonably be known immediately upon 
completion of trial.' Petitioner concedes and Respondent acknowledges that the Court has 
consistently and strictly applied Section 19-2719 to bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
in any but initial post-conviction petitions. Brief at 18. Petitioner filed his first post-conviction 
petition in 1986, and, in that petition, he did not claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Petitioner acknowledges that under clear and consistently applied Idaho 
law, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims pressed in his most recent post-conviction 
petition are waived. Thus, he agrees, arguendo, with Respondent that under this law, the Court is 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,472,903 P.2d 58,61, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1995) ("A 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also one that should reasonably be known 
immediately upon the completion of trial); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho at 759-60, 852 P.2d 
1355,1356-57, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1993) (same); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419, 825 P.2d 
1073, 1075, reh'g denied (Idaho 1992) (same); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 578,21 P.3d 895, 
900 (Idaho 2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299,303, 17 P.3d 243,247, reh 'g denied (Idaho 
2001); see also Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2001) (IAC 
claims waived where not raised within 42 days ofjudgment), and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,8 
P.3d 636, reh'g denied (Idaho 2000) (same); and Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420,423, 80 P.3d 
1021 (2003) (same). 
without jurisdiction to grant him relief. Brief at 19. 
Respondent, however, suggests a way in which the Court may find that Petitioner waived 
his claims with new counsel. Specifically, Respondent suggests that under a new, as yet 
unannounced rule, Petitioner has had an opportunity to raise IAC claims through new counsel but 
failed to seize it and, therefore, has waived the claims. Brief at 20. Abstractly, this argument 
might make sense if the claims had beell somehow held in abeyance until the appointment of new 
counsel rather than waived 42 days after the trial court entered its judgment. But no such 
abeyance doctrine or law exists in Idaho. Thus, in the concrete context of this case, where 
Petitioner's IAC claims were not held in abeyance until new counsel was appointed. Instead, 
they were, under this Court's consistent and strictly applied precedent, waived after the IAC 
claim went unraised for 42 days after judgment was entered against Petitioner.' 
Respondent also acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief to a 
death-sentenced petitioner who, in all relevant respects, was identically situated as compared to 
Petitioner. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9" Cir. 2001). Respondent, however, misconstrues 
Hoffman as primarily concerned with issues of federal habeas procedure and their threat to 
finality of Idaho convictions and sentences. (A copy of Hofman is attached for the Court's 
convenience.) Respondent suggests that the key to Idaho's maintaining control of the outcome of 
its cases is the regular and consistent application of Idaho Code Section 19-2719, warning that 
when state procedural bars are not applied regularly and consistently, "the federal courts 
disregard the bars and capital litigants are permitted to skirt principles of comity and federalism 
'Judgment was entered in the underlying proceedings against Petitioner on December 7, 
1982. 
by raising new claims for the first time in federal habeas petitions." Brief at 22 (citations 
omitted). Petitioner is confident that this Court appreciates that, in our federal system of 
government, state court judgments necessarily are subject to federal court review. Petitioner is 
likewise confident that this Court appreciates that its independence on matters of state law is 
protected by federal court review of its rulings implicating federal constitutional rights. Indeed, 
this Court may-and it has in some areas-provided Idaho citizens broader rights than allowed by 
the federal constitution. 
Contrary to Respondent's suggestion that Hoffman is a harbinger of the sky's falling, 
nowhere does that decision examine whether Idaho applies its Section 19-2719 procedural bar 
regularly and consistently. On the contrary, the court expressly found "that Hoffman's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted under Idaho Code 5 19- 
2719[.Jn Hof fan  v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 530. Relief was granted on an entirely different ground. 
Specifically, the court found that Section 19-2719 was "an unreasonable restriction on the 
exercise of the federally protected constitutional right to counsel and therefore is inadequate to 
bar federal review" in the petitioner's case. Id. (citations omitted). The court explained why: 
In Hoffman's case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that petitioner's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims were procedurally barred because they were filed 
after the expiration of the state's forty-two day statutory deadline. The Idaho 
Supreme Court applied the rule despite the fact that Hoffman continued to be 
represented by his original triai counsel during the forty-two day period. . . .In 
Hoffman's case, the application of 3 19-27 19, which at that time did not provide 
for the appointment of independent counsel, permitted trial counsel to continue to 
represent him during post-conviction proceedings, which they did. As a result, 
Hoffman was deprived of counsel who could review the record objectively for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Not surprisingly, Hoffman's trial counsel 
failed to raise and argue the issue of their own ineffectiveness in post-conviction 
proceedings. The practical reality, recognized by other states that employ the 
unitary post-conviction and appellate procedures-and, ultimately, recognized by 
the state of Idaho itself-is that it is the rare attorney who can be expected to 
contend on appeal that his representation was so poor that he deprived his client of 
a fair trial. 
Hoffman at 533-34. Petitioner is, as compared to Mr. Hoffman, identically situated in all 
relevant respects. Petitioner was "represented by his original trial counsel during the forty-two 
day period. . . .As a result, [Petitioner] was deprived of counsel who could review the record 
objectively for ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id As in Hof fan ,  Section 19-2719 
obstructed Petitioner's exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
It is noteworthy as well that, as the Hoffman court observed, Idaho's statutory and court 
rule changes make it unlikely that the difficulties found in Hoffman will recur: 
Significantly, both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho legislature have since 
adopted new regulations designed to prevent this situation from recurring. In 
1995, the Idaho Supreme court promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, which 
requires the trial court in a capital case to appoint at least one attorney other than 
trial counsel to represent the defendant in post-conviction proceedings. In the 
same year, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code $19-2719A, which permits 
the trial court to advise capital defendants that they are entitled to new counsel to 
pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims at post-conviction proceedings. 
Woman  at 534. The court is surely correct in its observation. Petitioner's case predates Mr. 
Hoffman's, and it is the last one known to undersigned counsel to present the same issue. 
Granting reliefwill have no consequences beyond this case. 
Finally, Respondent urges that if the Court does not apply Section 19-2719 in this case to 
find that Petitioner waived his IAC claims when he failed to raise them within 42 days of the 
judgment being entered in his case, the federal courts will determine that Idaho does not apply 
the Section 19-2719 procedural bar regularly and consistently and, consequently, will disregard 
the bar and allow litigants "to skirt principles of comity and federalism by raising new claims for 
the first time in federal habeas petitions." Brief at 22. However, it could hardly be clearer that in 
those cases where an Idaho petitioner's trial counsel represented him and in his first post- 
conviction proceedings and where he has waived IAC claims because he did not raise them in his 
that first post-conviction proceedings, the federal courts will not find those IAC claims defaulted 
because Section 19-2719 prevents such petitioners from pressing their Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel via their IAC claims in post-conviction proceedings. Hoffman. The federal courts 
cannot hold both that Section 19-2719 is an inadequate procedural bar in those circumstances 
and that Section 19-2719 is irregularly and inconsistently applied because this Court has acted to 
correct that statute's Sixth Amendment violation in a very small number of cases, including this 
one. 
B. Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of The Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Claims Because Defendants Are ConstitutionalIy Entitled To Presume That 
The Prosecution Fulfills Its Official Duties, Including Disclosure Duties, As A 
Matter Of State And Federal Due Process And Other Law. 
Incredibly, Respondent asks this Court to rule that if the prosecution succeeds in shirking 
its constitutionally mandated disclosure obligations long enough that the defense loses any 
remedy for that misconduct. It does so by ignoring or misconstruing clear Idaho and federal law 
This Court has held that, "Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that 
prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties, including the duty to disclose exculpatory 
material." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,647, 8 P.3d 636,642 (Idaho 2000) (citing Strickler v 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263,284-86 (1999)). More recently, but entirely consistently with Sivak, the 
United States Supreme Court held: 
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that the prosecution can lie and 
conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to discover the evidence, so long as 
the potential existence of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might have been 
detected. . .Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged 
their of-ficial duties. . .Court, litigants, and juries properly anticipate that 
obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction . . .plainly 
rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Prosecutors' 
dishonest conduct or unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial 
approbation. 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Respondent 
contends that Banks is limited to questions of procedure in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
While Banks does address those procedural questions, its rulings are hardly limited to them. "A 
rule thus declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process." Id. at 696. 
Respondent's contention that Petitioner has no remedy for the prosecutorial misconduct 
discovered in post-conviction proceedings flies in the face of these clear pronouncements of state 
and federal law. Where a conflict exists between the constitutional right to due process and a 
state procedural statute such as Idaho Code Section 19-2719, the constitutional right trumps the 
statute. However. Petitioner does not contend that the Court need strike Section 19-2719 as 
unconstitutional or rule its bars inapplicable in this case on due process grounds. Rather, it need 
merely hold that where the prosecution fails to meet its constitutionally mandated disclosure 
obligations, it cannot be said that defendants "reasonably should have known" claims arising 
from the undisclosed material. 
For all tlzeso reasons and for ail tlre reasons in Appellant's Opening Brief, eonsidefad 
individually and severally, this Court should reversc the lower court's suinmary dismissal. The 
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presentence interview; (4) petitioner's privilege 
PHoffman v. Arave against self-incrimination was not violated 
C.A.9 (Idaho),2001. during presentence interview; (5) petitioner was 
denied right to counsel when his requests to 
have counsel at presentence interview were 
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit. refused; (6)  trial court's consideration of 
Maxwell HOFFMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, allegedly unconstitutional aggravating factor in 
v. sentencing proceeding was harmless error; and, 
A.J. ARAVE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. p e r w ,  Circuit Judge, held that: (7) presence 
No. 99-99002. of aggravating circumstance was not element of 
capital case to be decided by jury. 
Argued and Submitted Sept. 15,2000 
Filed Jan. 3,2001 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
After his murder conviction and death sentence 
were upheld on direct appeal, 123 Idaho 638, 
851 P.2d 934, petitioner sought federal habeas 
corpus relief. The United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho, B. Lynn Winmill, Chief 
Judge, 973 F.Supp. 1152 and 73 F.Supp.2d 
1192. denied relief. Petitioner appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, per Preeerson, Circuit Judge, 
held that: (1) Idaho statute imposing 42-day 
deadline on capital defendants' postconviction 
and direct appeal claims was not adequate to 
foreclose federal habeas review of petitioner's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2) 
petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3) 
Teague nonretroactivity doctrine did not 
preclude petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
claims challenging denial of counsel during 
Preeerson, Circuit Judge, concurred separately 
in the result with respect to portion of opinion 
authored by Circuit Judge m. 
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"526 Joan M. Fisher, Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 
and Ellison Matthews, Boise, Idaho, for the 
petitioner-appellant. 
L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, 
Boise, Idaho, for the respondent-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho; B. Lvnn Winmill, District 
J u d g e ,  P r e s i d i n g .  D . C .  N o .  
CV-94-00200-S-BLW. 
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER and 
GOULD, Circuit Judges. 
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 
Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman") appeals the 
district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, in which he claims, inter alia, 
that the district court erred in finding that: (1) 
Idaho Code 6 19-2719 was an adequate and 
independent state law ground to support the state 
court's judgment that petitioner had defaulted his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2) 
petitioner's due process rights were not violated 
by the state trial court's refusal. to allow 
petitioner's attorney to be present at the 
presentence interview conducted by the state 
probation officer; (3) the "heinous, atrocious and 
cruel" aggravating factor in Idaho's capital 
sentencing law, Idaho Code 6 19-25 15(h)(5), 
was not unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the 
application of Idaho's capital sentencing scheme 
did not unconstitutionally deprive petitioner"527 
of ihe right to have a jury determine the presence 
of an aggravating circumstance in light of 
AD-prendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466.120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). 
This court has jurisdiction to review petitioner's 
claims under 28 U.S.C. 66 1291 and 2254. We 
affirm the district court's ruling that Hoffman's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 
procedurally defaulted under Idaho Code 5 
19-271 9, but reverse on the question whetherthe 
Idaho statute is "adequate" to preclude federal 
review of the underlying constitutional claim. 
Hoffman v. Arave. 973 F.Supp. 1152. 1166-68 
[D.Idaho 1997). We also reverse the district 
court's finding that Hoffman's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was not violated by the Idaho 
trial court's refusal to allow petitioner's attorney 
to be present at the presentence interview 
conducted by a state probation official. Ifoffman 
v. Arave. 73 F.Suv~.2d 1192,1203-07 (D.Idaho 
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19981R'" With respect to petitioner's remaining 
claims, we uphold the findings of the district 
court.? Accordingly, we affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing on petitioner's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
FNI, The district court issued two 
separate opinions with respect to 
Hoffman's federal habeas petition. In the 
first opinion, the court addressed the 
claims which had been dismissed by the 
Idaho Supreme Court as procedurally 
defaulted. In the second opinion, the 
court addressed Hoffman's remaining 
claims, which the Idaho Supreme Court 
had rejected on the merits. 
FN2. In Part V, a majority of the panel, 
Judges W. FLETCHER and GOULD, 
conclude that Hoffman's Apprendi claim 
is foreclosed by Walton v. Arizona. 497 
U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 
5 1 1 (1 990'). Judge PREGERSON does 
not believe that Walton precludes the 
application of Apprendi to Hoffman's 
case. Judge PREGERSON concludes, 
however, that the Apprendi error was 
harmless and thus concurs separately in 
Part v. 
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Facts and Procedurai History 
On March 16, 1989, an Idaho jury found 
Hoffman guilty of first degree murder for killing 
Denise Williams, a police informant. At trial, 
Hoffman, who is indigent, was represented by 
county public defenders William Wellman 
("Wellman") and Charles Coulter ("Coulter"). 
Following Hoffman's conviction, the state 
sought the death penalty. Pursuant to Idaho law, 
the state trial court conducted a separate 
sentencing proceeding, which included a 
presentence interview of the defendant by a 
probation officer, the submission of a 
presentence report written by the probation 
officer, and a sentencing hearing held by the 
court in which aggravating and mitigating 
evidence was presented by the state and defense 
counsel. After considering the testimony at trial 
and sentencing, and the presentence report 
submitted by the probation officer, the trial court 
imposed the death penalty. 
Before sentencing proceedings began, Hoffman's 
trial counsel filed a motion requesting the right 
to have counsel present at the presentence 
interview with the probation officer, which the 
court denied. Trial counsel also filed a motion 
pursuant to Idaho Code 66 19-2522(3)(a-R and 
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a requesting that the court order a psychiatrist 
or psychologist to examine "the mental 
condition of the defendant" and submit a written 
report to defense counsel. The court granted the 
motion and appointed psychologist David 
Sanford, Ph.D., to prepare a written evaluation 
of Hoffman and submit it to defense counse1.E 
Dr. Sanford prepared a report, in which he 
concluded that Hoffman was "illiterate," and 
"shows a rather consistent picture of brain 
damage to the left hemisphere" that created "528 
"significant articulation problems" and an 
"overall borderline intellectual capability." 
Hoffman's attorneys elected not to present 
Sanford's report at sentencing or "make any use 
of the psychological findings." 0'74 State V. 
Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P.2d 934. 937 
m, cert. denied, Hoffman v. Idaho. 5 1 1 U.S. 
1012,114 S.Ct. 1387,128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994). 
FN3. The court ordered that Dr. 
-
Sanford's report include: an account of 
the procedures used in the examination; 
a diagnosis of the defendant's mental 
state; an analysis of whether the 
defendant was functionally impaired; 
and an analysis ofwhether treatment was 
available for the defendant's mental 
condition, the risks of such treatment, 
and the risk posed by the defendant to 
society. 
FN4. The court order states, in relevant 
-
part "The Court advised the parties that 
defendant will have to decide whether he 
wants to use the psychologist as a 
witness so that the State can have an 
opportunity to review the report." The 
court went on to say that if defense 
counsel did intend to "use any part of 
[Sanford's] report at the time of 
sentencing, he will need to furnish a 
copy" to the prosecution several weeks 
before the sentencing hearing. 
On June 9, 1989, the court held a sentencing 
hearing to determine whether Hoffman would 
receive life in prison or the death penalty. 
Hoffman testified that he had spent most of his 
childhood as a ward of the state and some of his 
adult life in state penal institutions where he was 
incarcerated for burglary and robbery. He 
testified that his schooling had been sporadic, 
that he had never learned to read, and that he had 
chronic problems with alcohol and drugs. 
On June 13, 1989, the trial court, after finding 
that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating evidence, sentenced Hoffman to 
death. In a written decision, the court found that 
two statutory aggravating factors, the killing of 
a government witness and the particularly 
"heinous, atrocious and cruel" nature of the 
murder, outweighed the mitigating factors, 
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which included Hoffman's drug addiction, 
educational deficiencies, and disadvantaged 
social background. 
Hoffman's petition for state post-conviction 
relief was timely filed on July 25, 1989, by trial 
counsel Wellman and Coulter, who continued to 
provide legal representation. Counsel requested 
an additional psychological evaluation, which 
was denied. The state court held an evidentiary 
hearing on the petition, which alleged multiple 
claims of error at trial and sentencing, and 
denied relief on December 13, 1989. 
Wellman and Coulter appealed to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The appeal consolidated the 
direct appeal and post-conviction claims of error 
as required by Idaho Code 6 19-2719. No issues 
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were 
raised in the appeal. On January 29, 1993, the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Hoffman's death 
sentence and the state trial court's denial of his 
post-conviction petition. See Hoffman. 85 1 
P.2d at 944,cert. denied, Hoffman v. Idaho. 5 1 1 
U.S. 1012. 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 
(1994'). 
Hoffman, represented by newly appointed 
counsel, Charles Peterson ("Peterson") and 
Ellison Matthews ("Matthews"), filed a second 
petition for post-conviction relief in the state 
district court on July 7, 1995. The petition 
alleged fourteen grounds for relief, including 
three claims asserting that petitioner had been 
denied the effective assistance ofcounsel attrial, 
sentencing, and on direct appeal. The state 
moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the 
fourteen claims were procedurally defaulted 
because Idaho Code 6 19-2719 mandates the 
filing of all post-conviction claims within 
forty-two days of the entry of judgment. The 
state district court denied relief on May 20, 
1996. 
Hoffman's attorneys appealed the dismissal of 
the second petition to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The state filed a motion to dismiss, in which it 
renewed its argument that the claims were 
procedurally defaulted. On December 6, 1996, 
the Idaho Supreme Court issued a brief, 
unexplained ruling granting the state's motion. 
See Hoffman. 973 F.Supo. at 1164. 
On April 2, 1996, Hoffman's counsel filed a 
federal habeas petition in the United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho asserting, 
inter alia, that: Idaho Code 6 19-2719 deprived 
petitioner of his 3 2 9  constitutional right to due 
process and equal protection; counsel's 
performance at trial, sentencing, and on appeal 
was deficient and prejudicial in violation of 
petitioner's Sixth Amendments rights; 
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel 
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claims were not procedurally barred; the trial 
court's refusal to allow petitioner to have 
counsel present for the presentence interview 
conducted by the probation officer violated his 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights; and the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" 
aggravating factor listed under Idaho Code 4 
19-2515(h)(5) was unconstitutionally vague. 
See Hoflman, 973 F.Supj~. at 1152. 
The District Court of Idaho issued two opinions 
concerning Hoffman's habeas petition. In the 
first opinion, issued on June 13, 1997, the court 
dismissed with prejudice some of Hoffman's 
claims for relief, including his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, based upon a 
finding of procedural defau1t.E 
FN5. The district court also found that 
-
petitioner had procedurally defaulted his 
claims that: (1) the denial of funds for a 
psychiatrist to assist petitioner's counsel 
at the state post-conviction proceedings 
violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendment rights; (2) the imposition of 
the death penalty was disproportionate to 
the nature of the crime and to the crimes 
for which other defendants had been 
sentenced to death in violation of his 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights; (3) Idaho Code 4 
19-2827 failed to channel meaningfully 
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the state supreme court's proportionality 
review; and (4) the Idaho statute 
authorizing the imposition of the death 
sentence without jury involvement 
violated his Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The 
district court's findings of procedural 
default with respect to these claims were 
correct and this court has no jurisdiction 
to review them. 
On December 28,1998, the district court issued 
its second opinion concerning Hoffman's habeas 
petition, which addressed the merits of the 
remaining claims?? See id. The court 
rejected all of the surviving claims in the 
petition. See id. On January 20, 1999, 
Hoffman's counsel filed a notice of appeal of the 
district court's denial of the petition. 
FN6. On February 27,1998, in between 
the first and second district court 
opinions, Hoffman filed a pro se motion 
to dismiss his habeas counsel, drop all 
further appeals, and vacate the stay of 
execution. On March 18, the district 
court ordered a psychological evaluation 
of Hoffman. A competency hearing was 
held on May 6, and on May 8, Hoffman 
was found competent to dismiss his 
appeals. On May 15, the court received 
documents signed by petitioner that 
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included a motion to reappoint counsel 
to represent him and a statement 
authorizing appointed counsel to file a 
petition for rehearing. The court 
reappointed Peterson and Ellison to 
represent petitioner. On May 22, counsel 
filed a motion to reinstate Hoffman's 
habeas petition. At the evidentiary 
hearing on the motion to reconsider, Dr. 
Craig W. Beaver, the court-appointed 
psychiatrist, testified that petitioner 
suffered from a mental defect because of 
his low IQ and had "a mental disease or 
disorder" because of significant 
depression. On June 1, the court granted 
petitioner's motion to reinstate the 
habeas petition. 
JlJ2J The district court's decision to grant or 
deny a 6habeas petition is reviewed de 
novo. Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015.1018 
(9th Cir.2000). Dismissal based on state 
procedural default presents issues of law 
reviewed de novo. Fields v. Calderon. 125 F.3d 
757,759-60 (9th Cir.1997). 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
121 The right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is "fundamental and essential to fair 
trials." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
344. 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); see 
also Evitts v. Lucev, 469 U.S. 387,394-96, 105 
S.Ct 830. 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Because this 
right "lies at the very foundation of the 
adversary system of criminal justice," habeas 
courts must be "particularly vigilant in 
scrutinizing the adequacy of state rules of 
procedural default which have the effect of 
barring federal habeas review of claims of 
ineffective *530 assistance of counsel." Enqlish 
v. Codv. 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th 
Cir.1998).m7 
FN7. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, unlike most claims alleging error 
at trial and sentencing, are best presented 
for the first time in collateral 
proceedings when the defendant is 
represented by new counsel, rather than 
on direct appeal, when the defendant is 
often represented by trial counsel. See 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
378, I06 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 
11986) ( "Indeed, an accused will often 
not realize that he has a meritorious 
ineffectiveness claim until he begins 
collateral proceedings, particularly if he 
retained trial counsel on direct appeal."). 
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In this petition, Hoffman renews claims that he 
was deprived of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial, 
sentencing, and on appeal. The district court 
held that Idaho Code 6 19-2719 constituted a 
procedural bar that precluded federal habeas 
review of Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. While we agree with the district 
court that Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are vrocedurallv defaulted under 
Idaho Code 6 19-2?19, we findthat the statute is 
an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the 
federally protected constitutional right to 
counsel and therefore is inadequate to bar 
federal review. Michel v. Lousiana, 350 U.S. 91, 
93-94, 76 S.Ct. 158. 100 L.13d. 83 (19551; 
Endish, 146 F.3d at 1260-64. 
A. Procedural Default 
Ifll Idaho Code 6 19-2719 requires capital 
defendants to "file any legal or factual challenge 
to the sentence or conviction that is known or 
reasonably should be known" within 
forty-two days of the entry ofjudgment.? The 
judgment against Hoffman was entered on June 
13, 1989. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims were raised for the first time in a 
second petition for post-conviction relief, which 
was filed on July 7, 1995. The state responded 
with amotion to dismiss, arguing that the claims 
in Hoffman's post-conviction petition were 
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procedurally defaulted because they were not 
timely filed within the forty-two day period 
required by the statute. In a two-sentence order, 
the Idaho Supreme Court granted the state's 
motion and dismissed the petition. See 
Hoffman. 973 F.Suvp. at 1164. The federal 
district court concluded that Hoffman's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, raised 
for the first time after the expiration of the 
statute's forty-two day deadline, were 
procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1165-66; see also 
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 11 1 
S.Ct. 2590,115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991'); Coleman v. 
Thom~son. 501 U.S. 722. 735-36, 111 S.Ct. 
2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). We agree with 
the district court that Hoffman's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are procedurally 
defaulted under Idaho Code 6 19-2719, but now 
address the question whether this procedural 
default is adequate to preclude federal review. 
FN8. Idaho Code 6 19-2719(3) (West 
-
2000). 
FN9. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute's 42 day filing requirement. See 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795. 820 
P.2d 665, 676 (19911, cert. denied,= 
U.S. 987. 112 S.Ct. 2970. 119 L.Ed.2d 
590 (1992). 
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B. The Adequate and Independent State Law 
Grounds Doctrine 
151 In the usual case, state procedural rules 
dictate the time and manner in which federal 
constitutional rights are adjudicated in state 
court. Comity and federalism require federal 
courts to defer to the states' "dignitary interest in 
seeing that their state law decisions are not 
ignored by a federal habeas court." Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 738. 11 1 S.Ct. 2546. When a state 
court litigant raises a federal claim in a manner 
that does not comply with a state procedural 
rule, the state court may dismiss that claim as 
defaulted. So long as the dismissal relies on a 
state law ground that is independent of the 
federal question and adequate to support the 
judgment, it will be insulated from federal 
review. See, *531 e.g., Wainwri~ht v. Svkes, 
433 U.S. 72,81,97 S.Ct. 2497.53 L.Ed.2d 594 
0
The Supreme Court has held, however, that 
if a state procedural rule f'rustrates the exercise 
of a federal right, that rule is "inadequate" to 
preclude federal courts from reviewing the 
merits of the federal claim. See, e.g., Staub v. 
CitvofBaxlev. 355 U.S. 313,325.78 S.Q. 277. 
2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (holding that denial of 
petitioner's constitutional claims for failure to 
attack specific sections of the challenged 
ordinance was an inadequate state law ground). 
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a The "inadequate" state grounds doctrine is 
rooted in a concern that a state's rigid adherence 
to technical requirements of dubious validity 
may result in fundamental unfairness where 
federal rights are at stake. See Davis v. 
Wechsler. 263 U.S. 22.23.44 S.Ct. 13.68 L.Ed. 
143 (1923J (holding that "the assertion of 
Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably 
made, is not to be defeated under the name of 
local practice"). In a criminal case, the test for 
whether a state procedural rule constitutes an 
"insuperable barrier" to the assertion of a federal 
right is "whether the defendant has had 'a 
reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to 
the claimed right heard and determined' by the 
State court." Michel, 350 U.S. at 93. 76 S.Ct. 
158 (internal citations omitted). 
-
181 In Reece v. Georgia, a capital case, the 
Supreme Court applied the Michel test to a state 
court's dismissal of petitioner's challenge to the 
composition of the grand jury, filed afier an 
indictment was returned. The Georgia Supreme 
Court refused to consider Reece's claim on the 
merits, holding that Reece's claim was untimely 
under a state procedural rule requiring 
defendants to raise grand jury composition 
challenges before the indictment was returned. 
See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85.89.76 S.Ct. 
167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955). The Supreme Court 
reversed. Noting that Reece had no access to 
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counsel during the preindictment stage of the 
proceedings and that the grand jury was 
convened by an order that failed to give him 
notice that acase was being brought against him, 
the Court concluded that the state court's finding 
of procedural default was "utterly unrealistic." 
Id The Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Michel test in Reece makes clear that where the 
application of a state procedural rule operates to 
frustrate the exercise of a federal constitutional 
right, federal courts may reach the merits of the 
underlying federal claim. 
In English v. Cody, the Tenth Circuit held that a 
criminal defendant must be able to obtain an 
objective assessment of trial counsel's 
performance and be allowed to develop 
adequately the factual basis of any ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Considering an 
Oklahoma statute requiring criminal defendants 
to raise all ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct review, the court concluded that 
the state law would not bar federal review on the 
grounds of procedural default unless: (1) the 
defendant was appointed separate counsel on 
appeal; and (2) the claim could be resolved on 
the basis of the trial record alone. The opinion 
C. Idaho Code 6' 19-2719 Frustrated the noted that, unless one of the narrow exceptions 
Exercise o f  Hoffman's Sixth Amendment applied, there is a "constitutional imperative that 
" "" 
Claims 
The unique difficulties involved in arguing 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have 
led federal habeas courts to find "inadequate" a 
state procedural bar that denies a petitioner "any 
meaningful review of his ineffective assistance 
claim." Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 
1364 (10th Cir. 19941. Indeed, three federal 
circuit courts have held that where a criminal 
defendant does not comply with the procedural 
requirement that his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims be raised on direct appeal, he has 
not, in most circumstances, waived his right to 
have a federal court review those claims on the 
merits. 
this court "532 disregard a state bar 
for the review of ineffective assistance [of 
counsel] claims." Enalish, 146 F.3d at 1261. 
The Second and Seventh Circuits have reached 
the same conclusion. See Guinan v. United 
States, 6 F.3d 468, 471-73 (7th Cir.1993) 
(holding that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims not raised on direct appeal were not 
waived if the defendant continued to be 
represented by trial counsel or if the 
ineffectiveness claims required investigation 
outside of the trial record); Ciak v. United 
States, 59 F.3d 296. 303-04 (2d Cir.1995) 
(same). 
Because Idaho's unitary statute requires the 
consolidation of post-conviction and direct 
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appeal claims in a single petition and requires 
such consolidated claims to be filed within 
forty-two days of entry of judgment, it requires 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be 
raised on direct appeal. Thus, Hoffman is 
similarly situated to the defendants in Cody, 
Guinan, and Ciak with respect to the constraints 
imposed by state procedural rules on the 
timeliness of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
In 1984, the Idaho Legislature enacted 
Code 6 19-2719"to accon~plish the purpose of 
eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a 
valid death sentence." 2 The statute requires 
a capital defendant, within forty-two days of the 
entry of the judgment imposing the death 
penalty, to "file any legal or factual challenge to 
the sentence or conviction that is known or 
reasonably should be known." This 
forty-two's33 day deadline is the shortest in the 
nation and applies to "[alny remedy available by 
post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any 
other provision of state law." 2 Failure to 
file a claim for post-conviction relief within the 
statutory time limit is deemed a waiver, and the 
Idaho courts are stripped of the jurisdiction to 
hear "any such claims for relief." N') In 
addition, 3 19-27] 9 requires capital defendants 
to present simultaneously all post-conviction 
and direct appeal claims by combining them in 
a single petition for review by the Idaho 
Supreme Court.= 
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FNIO. Idaho Code 6 19-2719 (West 
2000). 
FNII. Idaho Code 6 19-271913L The 
relevant portions of the statute are set 
forth below: 
19-27 19: Special appellate and 
post-conviction procedure for capital 
cases-Automatic stay. 
The following special procedures shaIl 
be interpreted to accomplish the 
purpose of eliminating unnecessary 
delay in canying out a valid death 
sentence. 
(1) When the punishment of death is 
imposed the time for filing an appeal 
shall begin to run when the death 
warrant is filed. 
(2) The death warrant shall not be filed 
until forty-two (42) days after the 
judgment imposing the death sentence 
has been filed, or, in the event a 
post-conviction challenge to the 
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conviction or sentence is filed, until 
t h e  o r d e r  d e c i d i n g  s u c h  
post-conviction challenge is filed. 
(3) Within forty-two (42) days of the 
filing of the judgment imposing the 
punishment of death, and before the 
death wanant is filed, the defendant 
must file any legal or factual challenge 
to the sentence or conviction that is 
knownor reasonably should be known. 
(4) Any remedy available by 
post-conviction procedure, habeas 
corpus or any other provision of state 
law must be pursued according to the 
procedures set forth in this section and 
within the time limitations of 
subsection (3) of this section. 
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for 
relief as provided in this section and 
within the time limits specified, he 
shall be deemed to have waived such 
claims for relief as were known, or 
reasonably should have been known. 
The courts of Idaho shall have no 
power to consider any such claims for 
relief as have been so waived or grant 
any such relief. ... 
(6) In the event the defendant desires 
to appeal from any post-conviction 
order entered pursuant to this section, 
his appeal must be part of any appeal 
taken from the conviction or sentence. 
All issues relating to conviction, 
sentence and post-conviction challenge 
shall be considered in the same 
appellate proceeding. 
(7) If post-conviction challenge is 
made under this section, questions 
raised thereby shall be heard and 
decided by the district court within 
ninety (90) days of the filing of any 
motion or petition for relief timely 
filed as provided by this section. The 
court shall give first priority to capital 
cases. In the event the district court 
fails to act within the time specified, 
the supreme court of Idaho shall, on its 
own motion or the motion of any 
party, order the court to proceed 
forthwith, or if appropriate, reassign 
the case to another judge. When the 
supreme court intervenes as provided, 
it shall set a reasonable time limit for 
disposition of the issues before the 
district court. 
(8) The time limit provided in 
subsection (7) of this section for 
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disposition of post-conviction claims 
may be extended only upon a showing 
of extraordinary circumstances which 
would make it impossible to fairly 
consider defendant's claims in the time 
provided. Such showing must be made 
under oath and the district court's 
f ind ing  tha t  ex t raord inary  
circumstances exist for extending the 
time shall be in writing and shall be 
immediately reported to the supreme 
court, which shall at once 
independently consider the sufficiency 
of the circumstances shown and 
determine whether an extension of 
time is warranted. 
(9) When a judgment imposing the 
penalty of death is filed, the clerk and 
the reporter shall begin preparation of 
the transcripts of the trial, and other 
proceedings, and the clerk's transcript. 
(11) Any successive petition for 
post-conviction relief not within the 
exception of subsection (5) of this 
section shall be dismissed summarily. 
Notwithstanding any other statute or 
rule, the order of dismissal shall not be 
subject to any motion to alter, amend 
or reconsider. Such order shall not be 
subject to any requirement for the 
giving of notice of the court's intent to 
dismiss. The order of dismissal shall 
not be appealable. 
FN12. Id. at (4). 
FN13. Id. at (5). 
FN14. Currently, only California, 
Colorado, Idaho, and Texas have 
statutory schemes that require capital 
defendants to pursue simultaneously 
post-conviction and direct appeal claims 
in appealing to the state's highest court. 
See infra note 18. Similar statutes 
adopted in Florida, Missouri, and 
Pennsylvania have been invalidated. 
Florida's version of the unitary 
post-conviction-appellate statute, the 
Death Penalty Reform Act (DPRA), 
2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 00-3 (West), 
was struck down as unconstitutional 
under the state constitution by the 
Florida Supreme Court. See Allen v. 
Butterworth. 756 So.2d 52. 54 
(Fla.2000) (stating that "although our 
holding is based on the separation of 
powers claim, we find that some sections 
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of the DPRA also violate due process 
and equal protection"). Missouri's 
unitary system, codified in Mo. R.Crim. 
P. 24.035, 29.15, was amended on 
January 1,1996, to provide for tlie filing 
of all post-conviction motions "within 
ninety days a$er the date the mandate of 
the appellate court is issued." Mo. 
R.Crim. P. 29.15(b) (West 2000) 
(emphasis added). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court shuck down its version 
of the consolidated statute, the Capital 
Unitary Review Act, which was passed 
by the state's legislature in 1995. See42 
Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 6 6  9571(b),9577(a) 
(suspended by Order of Aug. 1 1, 1997). 
The court held that the statute violated 
the state's constitution by "directly 
conflicting with existing procedural 
rules." See In re Suspension o f  Capital 
Unitarv Review Act, 554 Pa. 625. 722 
A.2d 676.680 (19992. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly conshued 
the waiver provision of the statute as limiting a 
capital defendant to "one opportunity to raise all 
challenges to the conviction and sentence in a 
petition for post-conviction relief' except in 
"unusual cases." Rhoades, 820 P.2d at 677,cert. 
denied504 U.S. 987. 112 S.Ct. 2970, 119 
L.Ed.2d 590 (1992). Allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are not considered claims 
that fall within the "unusual cases" exception, 
but instead are considered claims that "should 
reasonably be known immediately upon the 
completion ofhial." Pizzuto v. State. 127 Idaho 
469. 903 P.2d 58, 61 (1995); see also 
State. 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355. 1356-57 
03). This is true even if the capital defendant 
seeking review of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims is also represented by trial 
counsel during post-conviction proceedings. 
See Paz, 852 P.2d at 1357-58 & n. 3 (Bistline, 
J., dissenting). 
Applying Idaho's forty-two day filing deadline to 
Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims raises fairness concerns similar to those 
posed by applying Georgia's statute of 
limitations to Reece's grand jury composition 
challenge. In Hoffman's case, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that petitioner's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims were procedurally barred 
because they were filed after the expiration of 
the state's forty-two day statutory deadline. The 
Idaho Supreme Court applied the rule despite the 
fact that Hoffman"534 continued to be 
represented by his original trial counsel during 
the forty-two day period.? See also EnglishL 
146 F.3d at 1260 (observing that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims involve assertions 
of attorney incompetence that require a 
petitioner "to consult with different counsel on 
appeal in order to obtain an objective assessment 
of trial counsel's performance"). 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
236 F.3d 523 Page 24 
236 F.3d 523, 01 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107, 2001 Daily Journal D.A.R. 159 
FN15. This was true of all indigent 
capital defendants in Idaho prior to 
1995. Effective August 8, 1995, the 
Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code 
4 19-27 19 to require an "Inquiry Into the 
Need For New Counsel." The 1995 
provision provides, in relevant part: 
After the imposition of a sentence of 
death, the trial judge should advise the 
defendant that, upon a particularized 
showing that there is a reasonable 
basis to litigate a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, new counsel 
may be appointed to represent the 
defendant to pursue such a claim in a 
post-conviction proceeding. 
Idaho Code 6 19-271 9A. 
Significantly, both the Idaho Supreme Court and 
the Idaho legislature have since adopted new 
regulations designed to prevent this situation 
from recurring. In 1995, the Idaho Supreme 
Court promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, 
which requires the trial court in a capital case to 
appoint at least one attorney other than trial 
counsel to represent the defendant in 
post-conviction proceedings. In the same year, 
the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code 6 
19-2719A, which permits the trial court to 
advise capital defendants that they are entitled to 
new counsel to pursue ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims at  post-conviction 
proceedings!? 
FN16. See 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 
140. The Idaho Supreme Court has yet to 
address the apparent conflict between 
Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 and Idaho Code $ 
19-27 1 9 4  although anecdotal evidence 
suggests that Idaho trial courts are 
applying Idaho Crim. R. 44.2. 
Idaho's forty-two day filing deadline, as applied 
to Hoffman, is uniquely harsh. Most states 
permit defendants to file petitions for 
post-conviction relief following the completion 
of their direct appea1s.F This bifurcated 
system allows for the appointment of new 
counsel, who can evaluate the record objectively 
to determine whether there are meritorious 
claims of ineffective assistance at trial and 
sentencing. 
FN17. See supra note 14. 
In Hoffman's case, the application of 4 19-2719, 
which at that time did not provide for the 
appointment of independent counsel, permitted 
trial counsel to continue to represent him during 
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post-convictionproceedings, which they did. As 
a result, Hoffman was deprived of counsel who 
could review the record objectively for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Not 
surprisingly, Hoffman's trial counsel failed to 
raise and argue the issue of their own 
ineffectiveness in post-conviction proceedings. 
The practical reality, recognized by other states 
that employ the unitary post-conviction and 
appellate procedures =-and, ultimately, 
recognized by the state of Idaho itself y - i s  that 
"[ilt is the rare attorney who can be expected to 
contend on appeal that his representation was so 
poor that he deprived his client of a fair trial." 
Ciak. 59 F.3d at 303. 
FN18. Currently, only three other 
states-California, Colorado, and 
Texas-employ a unitary scheme 
consolidating the post-conviction and 
appellate procedures into a single 
petition for review by the state's highest 
court. Of these, the Colorado and Texas 
statutes provide for the replacement of 
trial counsel with a different attorney 
when a defendant indicates that he 
intends to pursue ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in post-conviction 
proceedings. SeeColo. R.Crim. P. 
32.2(bM3); Tex.Crim.App. R. for 
Appointment of Counsel under art. 
11071, 5 2(d) (adopted by per curiam 
order of August 2, 1999). 
FN19. Effective August 8, 1995, the 
Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code 
3 19-27 19 to require an "Inquily Into the 
Need For New Counsel" where a capital 
defendant indicates that he wishes to 
raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. SeeIdaho Code 6 19-2719(A) 
and supra note 1 1. 
No allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel was made on Hoffman's behalf until 
1995, when a successive petition for *535 
post-conviction relief was filed by appointed 
counsel Peterson and Matthews, who replaced 
Hoffman's trial counsel. Peterson and Matthews 
investigated errors apparent from the record, and 
supplied the court with depositions and 
affidavits in which Hoffman's trial counsel 
admitted that they failed to: (1) obtain or review 
their client's educational, medical, or 
psychological records; (2) request a psychiatric 
evaluation of their client until after the trial 
despite awareness of his illiteracy, low 
intelligence, and psychological problems; and 
(3) follow up on the conclusion, stated in Dr. 
Sanford's report, that Hoffman suffered from 
possible brain damage. 
Peterson and Matihews also investigated errors 
outside of the record, and supplied the court 
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with depositions and affidavits in which trial 
counsel, neither of whom had previously tried a 
capital case, admitted that they had advised 
Hoffman to reject apleaof life in prison because 
they mistakenly believed, based on their 
misinterpretation of existing case law, that the 
Idaho death penalty statute would be found 
unconstitutional. Peterson and Matthews's 
petition was the first time that allegations 
documenting specific instances in which 
Hoffman's counsel had been ineffective had 
been presented to the state court. 
As Peterson and Matthews's investigation 
shows, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel requires review of the trial transcript and 
the entire record to determine the nature, 
frequency, and effect of counsel's errors. But 
Idaho Code 6 19-2719 makes no provision for 
expedited delivery of trial transcripts to ensure 
that compliance with the forty-two day filing 
deadline does not deprive capital defendants of 
access to the complete record of their cases.? 
Indeed, the record indicates that Hoffman's trial 
counsel prepared their post-conviction petition 
for relief without access to the trial transcript, 
which was completed on November 6, 1989, 
more than three months after the post-conviction 
petition was filed. Completion and service ofthe 
full record did not occur until late March of 
1990, several months after the state court ruled 
to deny Hoffman's post-conviction petition. 
FN20. The only reference in Idaho Code 
19-271 9 to the compilation of trial and 
sen tenc ing  r eco rds  pending  
post-conviction proceedings states: 
"When a judgment imposing the penalty 
of death is filed, the clerk and the 
reporter shall begin preparation of the 
transcripts of the trial, and other 
proceedings, and the clerk's transcript." 
Idaho Code 6 19-2719(9). The statute 
directs that preparation of the record 
begin immediately following the entry of 
a capital judgment, but provides no 
reciprocal mandatory date of completion. 
The investigation conducted by Peterson and 
Matthews also shows that raising a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires that 
new counsel have the opportunity to conduct an 
investigation beyond the court records to 
uncover possible omissions made by trial 
counsel in the investigation and presentation of 
the case. See, e.g.,Osborn v. Shillinper, 861 
F.2d 612 ,  623  (10th C i r . 1988)  
("[I]neffectiveness claims are ordinarily 
inappropriate to raise on direct appeal because 
they ... cannot be made on the basis of the record 
1.1"); Cruz v. Warden, 907 F.2d 665, 670 (7th 
Cir. 1990') ("An ineffective assistance claim 
alleging that counsel failed to prepare involves 
facts outside the trial record and presents a 
situation in which the Illinois courts will not 
invoke the res judicata or waiver doctrines."). 
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Hofhan's case involves allegations of 
ineffectiveness at trial, sentencing, and on 
appeal, stemming from counsel's legally 
inaccurate advice regarding the possibility that 
the death penalty would be imposed and 
counsel's failure to review educational, physical, 
and psychiatric records in order to present 
mitigating evidence. All of these allegations 
required investigation outside of the record at 
trial. 
reasonable possibility that offering expert 
testimony and a thorough history of Hoffman's 
educational, medical, and psychological 
problems at the time of the murder might have 
reduced the lilcelihood that the death penalty 
would have been imposed. We therefore remand 
for an evidentiary hearing to develop a factual 
record regarding Hoffman's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. See Siriaonzs v. 
Calderon. 35 F.3d 1308, 1315-16 (9th 
Cir.1994'); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 
1 170 (9th Cir. 1990). 
For the reasons outlined above, 4 19-2719 111. 
effectively prevented Hoffman from "536 timely 
raising his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
Rights During The Presentence Interview 
D. Evidentiary Hearing on Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Because the state court denied Hoffman's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims without 
holding a hearing, and the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the federal district court affirmed the denial 
on procedural grounds, those claims have never 
been litigated on the merits. Without the benefit 
of an evidentiary hearing, it is impossible to 
evaluate the strength of Hoffman's defense at 
trial and sentencing. Therefore, we cannot 
conclude as a matter of law that there is no 
[l S 111 21 Hoffman challenges the trial court's 
denial of his request to have counsel present 
during the presentence interview with the 
probation officer as a violation of his Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Hoffman contends that under Estelle v. Smith. 
451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866.68 L.Ed.2d 359 
0,the court may not, during the capital 
sentencing hearing, and when making the 
sentence determination, rely upon statements 
obtained through the custodial presentence 
interview without the aid of counsel. Although 
petitioner failed to raise this claim in his 
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consolidated appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
the Idaho death penalty statute requires 
mandatory review of the entire record for 
sentencing errors. See Beam v. Pasketl, 3 F.3d 
1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir.19931, overruled on 
other grounds by Lambright v. Stewarl. 191 
F.3d 1 181, 1 185 (9th Cir. 1999). All sentencing 
errors are treated as implicitly raised, removing 
the bar of procedural default. See Beam, 3 F.3d 
at 1306-07. The federal district court thus 
appropriately reached the merits of Hoffman's 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Estelle claims. See 
Hoffman, 73 F.Supp.2d at 1203-07. The district 
court denied the claims by distinguishing 
Hoffman's case from Estelle, and held that the 
presentence interview is not a critical stage. See 
id, at 1207. Because we conclude that Estelle 
controls in the context of a capital case, we 
reverse. 
In all capital cases, Idaho law requires a 
presentence investigation and report prior to the 
commencement of the sentencing hearing. 
SeeIdaho Code 6 19-25 15(c); State v. Creech, 
105 Idaho 362. 670 P.2d 463 (19831. The 
presentence report provides "crucial 
information" to the court, Idaho v. Romero. 1 16 
Idaho 391,396,775 P.2d 1233 (1  9891, including 
information about the defendant's social history, 
educational background, "sense of values and 
outlook on life," and the "presentence 
investigator's analysis." I.C.R. 32. The trial 
court denied Hoffman's motion for counsel at 
the presentence interview, and the probation 
officer refused Hoffman's renewed requests for 
counsel during the interview itself. The trial 
court instructed the Deputy Attorney General to 
ensure that Hoffman was advised by the 
probation officer at the beginning of his 
presentence interview of his right to remain 
silent. See fIofhnzan, 73 F.Supp.2d. at 1206. 
During the interview, Hoffman made a number 
of incriminating statements. He discussed the 
murder of Denise Williams with the probation 
officer and made multiple equivocal statements 
about his involvement.*537 NZ' Hoffman 
conceded in the interview that he had known 
that Williams was an informant and that he did 
not think that what she did was right. Hoffman 
also told the probation officer that although he 
had recently found the "Lord," he had been 
previously living the life of a "demon." Most 
significantly, Hoffman admitted that he had been 
present at two unrelated murders and indicated 
that although he could have helped prevent these 
murders, he did not make any such attempt. The 
probation officer recommended in the 
presentence report to the trial court that Hoffman 
be sentenced to the "maximum punishment," 
which in this case was death. 
FN21. When asked whether he was 
involved in William's murder Hoffman 
told the probation officer, "I'm not 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
236 F.3d 523 Page 29 
236 F.3d 523,Ol Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107,2001 Daily Journal D.A.R. 159 
saying I'm not involved and I'm not 
saying I am involved." Hoffman would 
not answer yes or no to the probation 
officer's question about whether 
Hoffman was present at the time of the 
murder. The presentence report explains 
that Hoffman refused to answer no 
"because he could be lying." 
1131r1411151 Idaho contends that applying 
Estelle to Hoffman's case would constitute a 
new rule in violation of Teame v. Lane. 489 
U.S. 288. 109 S.Ct. 1060. 103 L.Ed.2d 334 
m. Once the state raises the Teague defense, 
we are compelled to address whether Teague 
applies before determining the merits of the 
claim. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 
389. 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). 
With few exceptions, the Teague 
non-retroactivity doctrine prohibits courts from 
announcing new rules of law in federal habeas 
pr0ceedings.y See, e.g., Revnoldsville Casket 
Co. v. Hvde, 514U.S.749,758,115S.Ct. 1745, 
13 1 L.Ed.2d 820 (1 995). A decision announces 
a "new rule" if it "breaks new ground or imposes 
anewobligation." Teaaue. 489U.S. at 301,109 
S.Ct. 1060. "To determine what counts as anew 
rule, Teague requires courts to ask whether the 
rule a habeas petitioner seeks can be 
meaningfully distinguished from that established 
by binding precedent at the time his state court 
conviction became final." Wright v. West. 505 
U.S. 277,304,112 S.Ct. 2482,120 L.Ed.2d 225 
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). We consider 
the "legal landscape as it [ ] existed" on March 
28, 1994, the date Hoffman's conviction and 
sentence became final.= Casvari, 5 10 U.S. at 
390,114 S.Ct. 948 (internalquotations omitted). 
FN22. The Supreme Court's plurality 
opinion delineated two exceptions to the 
non-retroactivity principle announced in 
Teague: (1) new rules that place 
"certain kinds of primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of 
the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe," and (2) new rules involving 
procedures "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." Teaaue. 489 U.S. at 
307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
FN23. The Supreme Court denied 
Hoffman's petition for certiorari on 
March 28,1994. See Hoffman v. Idaho. 
511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128 
L.Ed.2d 61 (1994). 
A. Hoffman's Ffth Amendment Claim 
1161 The Supreme Court decided Estelle v. 
Smith in 198 1, over a decade before Hoffman's 
conviction became final. In Estelle, a Texas trial 
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court sua sponte ordered the state's attorney to 
mange apsychiatric evaluation of the defendant 
to determine the defendant's competency to 
stand trial. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57. 101 
S.Ct. 1866. The defendant was foundcompetent, 
and, after a jury trial, convicted of murder. See 
id. at 457,101 S.Ct. 1866. As required by Texas 
law, a separate proceeding was then undertaken 
before the same jury to consider whether the 
defendant should receive the death penalty. See 
id. at458.101 S.Ct 1866. During the sentencing 
hearing, the state offered the testimony of the 
court-appointed psychiatrist, who had 
interviewed the defendant solelv for comDetencv 
purposes, to establish the defendant's future 
dangerousness. The psychiatrist testified before 
the jury that the defendant "is a very severe 
sociopath," that "he will continue his previous 
behavior," that his condition will "only get 
worse," and that he "has no remorse or sorrow 
for what he has done." *538 id at 459-60.101 
S.Ct. 1866. After hearing the psychiatrist's 
testimony, the jury imposed the death penalty. 
See id. 
The Supreme Court in Estelle concluded that the 
Fifth Amendment applied to the defendant's 
interview with the psychiatrist, when the 
incriminating statements made by the defendant 
formed the basis of the psychiatrist's testimony, 
which was considered by the jury in determining 
the sentence to be imposed on the defendant. Id. 
at 462-69. 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Supreme Court 
began its Fifth Amendment analysis by noting 
that "the availability of the ... [Fifth 
Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the 
type of proceeding in which its protection is 
invoiced, hut upon the nature of the statement or 
admission and the exposure which it invites." 
Id. at 462. 101 S.Ct. 1866 (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court then found that the 
consequence at stake in capital sentencing, the 
"ultimate penalty of death," triggered the 
constitutional protection of the Fifth 
Amendment. Id. at462-63.101 S.Ct. 1866. "Just 
as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal 
defendant from being made 'the deluded 
instrument of his own conviction,' it protects 
him as well from being made the 'deluded 
instrument' of his own execution." Id. at 462, 
101 S.Ct. 1866 (internal citations omitted). 
One year later, this court concluded that under 
Estelle, the Fifth Amendment applied to 
inculpatory statements made during a 
presentence interview with a probation officer. 
See .Jones v. Curdwell, 686 F.2d 754. 756 (9th 
Cir.1982) ("The reasoning that underlies the 
decision in Estelle supports application of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege to the sentencing 
procedures in the instant case."). We reasoned 
that although not 
every encounter between the state and a 
convicted but unsentenced defendant brings 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
236 F.3d 523 Page 3 1 
236 F.3d 523,Ol Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107,2001 Daily Journal D.A.R. 159 
the Fifth Amendment privilege into play .... 
[Wlhere, as here, the state's agent seelts from 
the convicted defendant a confession of 
additional criminal activity and that confession 
is used to enhance a defendant's sentence, we 
think it beyond peradventure that the 
defendant may properly claim the protection of 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Hoffman's claim that his Fifth Amendment 
privilege applied during the presentence 
interview is controlled by the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Estelle that a capital defendant's 
inculpatory statements made during an interview 
with a psychiatrist are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and this court's ruling in 
Jones that a defendant's inculpatory statements 
made during a presentence interview are 
protected by the Fifth Amendment when the 
statements may be used to increase the severity 
of sentencing. We therefore reject the 
government's argument that Hoffman's Fifth 
Amendment claim is barred by Teague, and 
proceed to consider the claim on the merits. 
1171 Hoffman's Fifth Amendment claim is 
undercut by the fact that Hoffman was advised 
that he could exercise his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent during the presentence 
interview. See Hofman. 73 F.Supp.2d at 1206. 
Hoffman does not argue on appeal that the 
damaging statements made during the 
presentence interview were involuntary in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Cf: 
Jones, 686 F.2d at 757 .(holding statements 
involuntary where probation officer instructed 
defendant to answer all questions and questioned 
defendant about additional criminal activity). 
We conclude that although the Fifth Amendment 
privilege applies, it was not violated in the 
circumstance of this particular case. 
B. Hofian's  Sixth Amendment Claim 
11 81 11 91 1201 The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a criminal defendant "the right ... to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. 
Const. amend. VI. "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attachesk539 'at or after the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminav hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.' " United States v. Harrison. 213 
F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,689,92 S.Ct. 1877.32 
L.Ed.2d 41 1 (19721). Hoffman's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached before 
trial. See Estelle. 451 U.S. at 469-70, 101 S.Ct. 
1866. Once the right has attached, the Sixth 
Amendment "is violated whenever the accused 
is denied counsel at a critical stage" of the 
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adversary proceeding. United States v. Bohn, 
890 F.2d 1079. 1080 (9th Cir.1989) (internal 
quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has 
long recognized sentencing as a critical stage. 
See, e.g., Gardnerv. Florida. 430U.S. 349,358, 
97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) ("[Ilt is 
now clear that the sentencing process, as well as 
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause .... [Tlhe sentencing is a 
critical stage ofthe criminal proceeding at which 
[the defendant] is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel."). The issue in this case is 
whether the presentence interview conducted by 
a probation officer in preparation for the capital 
sentencing hearing constitutes a "critical stage" 
of the judicial proceedings. 
1211 Hoffman again relies on Estelle for his 
claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel during the presentence 
interview. As set forth above, the Supreme 
Court held in Estelle that the defendant's right to 
counsel extended to an interview with a 
court-appointed psychiatrist prior to sentencing. 
451 U.S. at 469-70, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Court 
reasoned that the interview played a significant 
role in sentencing, and thus constituted a 
"critical stage" for the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment analysis. Id at 470-71. 101 S.Ct. 
1866. Hoffman contends that Eslelle governs his 
-
case, because like the defendant in Estelle, 
Hoffman faces sentencing, "literally a life or 
death matter," based on information gathered in 
an interview conducted without the benefit of 
counsel. See id. at 471, 101 S.Ct. 1866. 
The state argues that this court's decision in 
Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9th 
Cir.19821, forecloses the application of Estelle 
to presentence interviews in capital cases, and 
that any decision to the contrary would violate 
Teague. We read Baumann differently. The 
defendant in Baumann was sentenced to a 
five-year prison term on four counts of mail 
fraud. 692 F.2d at 569. Baumann relied on 
Estelle and challenged the lack of counsel during 
his presentence interview as a denial of his Sixth 
Amendment right. Id. at 574. We rejected 
Baumann's claim, declining to characterize a 
"routine" presentence interview as a critical 
stage. Id. at 578. We similarly rejected 
Baumann's Fifth Amendment claim that he was 
entitled to full Miranda warnings before 
submitting to apresentence interview. Id. at 576. 
We reached our Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
conclusions in Baumann by distinguishing the 
capital bifurcated jury proceeding in Estelle 
from Baumann's "noncapital," "routine" 
sentencing. 692 F.2d at 576-78. We noted that 
the question of whether the defendant in 
Baumann was entitled to Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protection during the non-capital 
presentence interview had some "similarity to 
the [question] advanced in Estelle," but read 
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Estelle "narrowly" and found that the force of 
Estelle 's reasoning was "limited to the distinct 
circumstances of [ ] bifurcated capital 
proceedings." Id. at 575-76. 
Our decision in Baumann not to apply the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel to 
routine presentence interviews with probation 
officers rested on the "substantial difference[sIn 
in sentencing procedure and stakes between 
capital and routine cases. See id. at 576. By 
distinguishing the procedures required in capital 
presentence stages from those permitted in 
non-capital presentence interviews, Baumann 
joined a long line of cases requiring"540 
heightened procedural safeguards in capital 
cases. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 
125-27.111 S.Ct. 1723,114L.Ed.2d 173 (1991) 
(weighing the "special importance of fair 
procedure in the capital sentencing context" and 
holding that the lack of notice to the defendant 
of Idaho's intent to seek the death penalty 
violated Due Process); Eddina.7 v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 111, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (discussing heightened 
protections in capital cases and reversing death 
sentence because the jury was not permitted to 
consider all of the capital defendant's mitigating 
character evidence); Beck v. Alabanza, 447 U.S. 
6 s  
Q?SJj (noting the Court's "often stated" 
principle that "there is a significant 
constitutional difference between the death 
penalty and lesser punishments," and 
overturning death sentence because the jury was 
not instructed on a lesser included noncapital 
offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280,305,96 S.Ct. 2978.49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) 
(finding that "the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment," and therefore holding North 
Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute 
unconstitutional). 
We also limited the holding of Baumann. in 
federal cases in United States v. 
Iierrera-Fiaueroa. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th 
Cir. 1991). In Herrera-Figueroa we exercised 
our supervisory power to require that probation 
officers permit defense attorneys to accompany 
defendants in all presentence interviews. See 
id. 
We find that a presentence interview in a 
capital case is a "critical stage" for the purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. This 
conclusion is compelled by the principle from 
Estelle that defendants should not face 
presentencing stages in capital cases without the 
benefit of counsel, and the Baumann distinction 
between capital and non-capital cases.fE The 
presentence interview is a mandatory part of 
Idaho's capital sentencing scheme and forms the 
basis of the presentence report, considered by 
the court during sentencing. "Given the gravity 
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of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, 
the State is not relieved of the obligation to 
observe fundamental constitutional guarantees." 
Estelle. 451 U.S. at 463. 101 S.Ct. 1866. The 
stakes for the defendant and for society are too 
high to allow defendants to face this important 
component of the sentencing process without the 
"guiding hand of counsel." Id. at 471, 10 1 S.Ct. 
1866 We find that this conclusion is dictated by 
-. 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent 
available at the time of Hoffman's conviction, 
and thus conclude that Teague does not apply. 
FN24. The State's reliance on m d  
States v. Benlian. 63 F.3d 824 (9th 
Cir.1995) for the proposition that a 
presentence interview in a capital case is 
not acritical stage is equally unavailing. 
In Benlian we reiterated our adherence 
to the Baumann holding in a non-capital 
case where the defendant waived the 
right to counsel. See Benlian, 63 F.3d. 
a. 
Turning to the merits of Hoffman's 
claim, we conclude that Hoffman was denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the 
presentence interview. The next step of our 
analysis is to ask whether this constitutional 
violation is "harmless error." Satterwhite v. 
Texas, 486 U.S. 249.256, 108 S.Ct. 1792. 100 
L.Ed.2d284 (1988). We apply the standard from 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619.113 S.Ct. 
1710. 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), to Hoffman's 
habeas petition, and ask whether Hoffman 
established that the "error had a substantial and 
injurious effect" on his sentence. See Bains v. 
Cambra, 204 F.3d 964. 977 (9th Cir.2000) 
(holding that the Brecht harmless error standard 
applies in ail federal habeas corpus cases under 
S). 
We cannot adequately evaluate the impact 
of Hoffman's incriminating statements made 
during the presentence interview without 
considering the full body *541 of mitigating and 
aggravating evidence considered at sentencing. 
Hoffman's allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel at the trial and sentencing cast doubt 
over the reliability of this body of evidence; he 
alleges that damaging information would have 
been excluded and beneficial information 
admitted had he received effective assistance of 
counsel. If Hoffman proves these allegations at 
the ineffectiveness hearing, then Hoffman's 
statements made during the presentence 
interview, withoutthe benefit of counsel, may be 
sufficiently damaging to constitute error. We 
therefore remand the question whether the denial 
of counsel at the presentence hearing constituted 
"harmless error" based, in part, on relevant 
evidence that may be developed at the hearing to 
determine whether Hoffman was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. 
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IV. 
Application of the "Heinous, Atrocious or 
Cruel" Aggravating Factor 
Hoffman alleges that during sentencing the 
trial court relied upon an unconstitutionally 
vague aggravating factor, "that the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 
rnanifestingexceptional depravity." Idaho Code 
4 19-2515ChX5). Hoffman contends that the 
Idaho Supreme Court's construction of this 
factor fails to narrow sufficiently the sentencer's 
discretion as required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. He asserts that the 
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor 
fails to pass constitutional muster for the same 
reasons that the United States Supreme Court 
found Oklahoma's "especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor invalid in 
Maynard v. Carlwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64, 
108 S.Ct. 1853,lOO L.Ed.2d 372 (1 988L We do 
not reach the merits of this claim because we 
conclude that the trial court's consideration of 
the challenged sentencing factor would 
constitute harmless error, assuming that the 
factor is unconstitutional. 
12711281 The appropriate remedy for reliance 
upon an unconstitutional aggravating factor 
depends in part on whether the state statute is a 
weighing or non-weighing statuteY2 
Generally, in states with non-weighing schemes, 
reviewing courts may affirm the sentence if 
other valid aggravating factors remain. See 
Williams v. Calderon. 52 F.3d 1465. 1477 (9th 
Cir. 1995); c$ Tuegle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 
10, 13-14, 116 S.Ct. 283, 133 L.Ed.2d 251 
(clarifying that this rule does not permit 
affirmance in cases where the constitutional taint 
of the illegitimate factor infects the other 
factors). A court reviewing a sentence imposed 
under a weighing scheme must conduct 
constitutional harmless-error analysis or require 
a reweighing. See Williams, 52 F.3d at 
1 A77 FN26 
FN25. A weighing statute requires the 
decision maker to weigh the mitigating 
evidence against the statutory 
aggravators in order to impose the death 
penalty; a non-weighing statute requires 
a threshold finding of an aggravator and 
then instructs the decision-maker to 
weigh all relevant evidence. See, e.g., 
Zanl v. Ste~hens. 462 U.S. 862.879.103 
S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). 
FN26. In contrast, "when the sentencing 
body is told to weigh an invalid factor in 
its decision, a reviewing court may not 
assume it would have made no 
difference if the thumb had been 
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removed from death's side of the scale." 
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232. 112 S.Ct. 
1130. 
-
At the time of Hoffman's conviction, the Idaho 
death penalty statute required the sentencing 
court to weigh the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating circumstances. See 
Williams, 52 F.3d at 1478 n. 13 ("Idaho has been 
treated as a weighing state because of the 
explicit procedural constraint."); Beam v. 
Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 13 10 n. 10,overruled on 
other grounds by Lambrigkt v. Stewurt 191 
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.1999;) (noting that Idaho 
statute requires courts to weigheach aggravating 
factor against all mitigating factors). We 
therefore apply harmless-error analysis and ask 
whether the allegedly invalid aggravating factor 
had a "substantial *542 and injurious effect or 
influence" on the court's determination. 
Williams. 52 F.3d at 1476. 
The trial court in Hoffman's case independently 
weighed the mitigating evidence against two 
statutory aggravating circumstances: one, the 
unchallenged circumstance, the victim's status as 
a potential witness in a legal proceeding, and 
two, the challenged heinous, atrocious, and cruel 
circumstance. SeeIdaho Code S 19-25 15(11)151 
and (10). The, court determined that each 
aggravating circumstance, standing alone, 
outweighed the mitigating evidence. We 
conclude that any error that arose from the 
court's consideration of the heinous, atrocious 
and cruel aggravating factor did not affect the 
court's determination, and constitutes harmless 
error. 
Hoffman's Claim That the Jury Should 
Determine the Presence of Aggravating 
Circumstances 
GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom W. 
FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurs: 
We concur in Judge Pregerson's opinion as to 
Parts I through IV. However, we deliver the 
opinion of the court as to Part V. 
1291 Hoffman argues that in light ofAprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348. 147 
L.Ed.2d 435 (20001, Idaho's capital sentencing 
statute unconstitutionally deprives him of the 
right to have a jury-rather than a 
judge-determine the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance, a determination that could result 
in a sentence of death. In Apprendi, the Supreme 
Court announced a general rule that "any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
236 F.3d 523 
236 F.3d 523,Ol Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107,2001 Daily Journal D.A.R. 159 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 2362-63. Hoffman 
contends that the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance should be treated as an element of 
a capital case to be decided by the jury rather 
than as a factor in sentence enhancement to be 
decided by the judge. 
In Walton v. Arizona, the Supreme Court 
addressed a similar sentencing scheme and held 
that the presence of an aggravating circumstance 
in a capital case may constitutionally be 
determined by a judge rather than a jury. 497 
U.S. 639.647-48. 110 S.Ct. 3047.11 1 L.Ed.2d 
5 1 1 (1990). The Supreme Court in Apprendi did 
not overrule Walton. It wrote: 
Finally, this Court has previously considered 
and rejected the argument that the principles 
guiding our decision today render invalid state 
capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, 
after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty 
of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating 
factors before imposing a sentence of death. 
AD-~rendi. 120 S.Ct. at 2366 (citing Walton, 497 
U.S. at 647-49, 110 S.Ct. 3047: Id at 709-14, 
110 S.Ct. 3047 (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
We are aware that four dissenting Justices in 
Apprendi asserted that Apprendi effectively 
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overruled Walton, and that one concurring 
Justice stated that Walton could be reexamined 
on "another day." But while Apprendi may raise 
some doubt about Walton, it is not our place to 
engage in anticipatory overruling. The Supreme 
Court has specifically directed lower courts to 
"leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions." Agostini v. 
Felton. 521 U.S. 203,207, 117 S.Ct. 1997,138 
L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (citing Rodriguezde Ouiias 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.. 490 U.S. 
477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 
m). We therefore conclude that Walton 
forecloses Hoffman's Apprendi-based challenge 
to Idaho's capital sentencing scheme. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
We REMAND to the district court for an 
evidentiary hearing on petitioner's 
ineffective"543 assistance of counsel claims in 
accordance with this opinion. WeREVERSE the 
district court's ruling that the Fifth and Sixth 
- 
Amendments did not apply to petitioner's 
presentence interview, and defer judgment 
- - 
khether the denial of counsel during petitioner's 
presentence interview constitutes harmless error 
until after the ineffective assistance of counsel 
hearing. We AFFIRM the district court's denial 
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of all other claims. 
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring 
separately in the result of Part V: 
I respectfully disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Walton forecloses Hoffman's 
Apprendi-based challenge to Idaho's capital 
sentencing scheme. 
The specific question whether the presence of an 
aggravating circumstance in a capital case is a 
matter to be determined by a jury was answered 
in the negative by the Supreme Court in 
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639. 110 S.Ct. 3047. 11 1 
L.Ed.2d 51 1 (19901, which was decided ten 
years before Appvendi. Resolution of 
Hoffman's claim thus requires consideration of 
the present viability of Walfon in light of 
Apprendi, and analysis ofwhether the holding of 
Apprendi extends to the determination of an 
aggravating circumstance under Idaho's capital 
sentencing scheme. 
Idaho argues that Hoffman's Apprendi claim was 
procedurally defaulted because he failed to 
exhaust this claim in state court, or alternatively, 
that requiring a jury to determine the presence of 
the statutory aggravating circumstance would 
impose a new rule in violation of Teague. 
Although the Apprendi claim may have been 
procedurally defaulted,fN'7 Idaho's capital 
appellate sentencing statute requires mandatory 
review of the entire record for sentencing errors 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. SeeIdaho Code $ 
19-2827; Beum v. Puskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306 
(1993'), overruled on other grounds by 
Lambripht v. Stewart. 191 F.3d 1181 (9th 
Cir. 1999). Sentencing errors are thus treated as 
implicitly raised, removing the bar of procedural 
default. Id As discussed below, I would find 
that requiring a jury to determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt the presence of aggravating 
circumstances in a capital case constitutes a new 
rule. I would conclude, however, that it falls 
within one of the two exceptions to the Teague 
non-retroactivity doctrine and would therefore 
consider the Apprendi claim on the merits. 
FN27. Hoffman filed a motion before 
sentencing with the trial court to "have a 
jury empaneled for the purpose of 
sentencing, or in the alternative, to serve 
in an advisory capacity to the trial 
court." See State ofIdaho v. Hoffman, 
123 Idaho 638, 643. 851 P.2d 934 
(1993'). The trial court denied the 
motion, and Hoffman appealed the 
denial in his consolidated appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that the Idaho 
Constitution does not require that a jury 
rather than ajudge determine sentencing. 
Id. Because Hoffman appears to have 
raised the right to a jury trial on state 
constitutional grounds alone, the federal 
grounds arguably were defaulted. 
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A. Idaho's First Degree Murder Statute 
Before 1977, Idaho law imposed the death 
penalty for all first degree murder convictions. 
SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4004 (1976) ("[elvery 
person guilty of murder in the first degree shall 
suffer death"). After the Supreme Court 
invalidated North Carolina's mandatory death 
penalty statute in Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978. 49 L.Ed.2d 944 
/1976), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
Idaho first degree murder statute was 
unconstitutional. See State v. Lindauist. 99 
Idaho 766, 768, 589 P.2d 101 (1979) (noting 
that the Idaho statute was "virtually identical" to 
the North Carolina statute). The Idaho 
legislature responded to Woodson by making 
two critical statutory changes: first, the 
legislature changed the language of 3 18-4004 to 
allow for the option of death or life 
imprisonment; second, the legislature"544 
amended 3 18-4004 to incorporate a new 
statutory section. Under this new section, $ 
19-251 5, the trial judge, before the death penalty 
can be imposed, is required to find the presence 
of a statutory aggravating circumstance and then 
determine that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighs any mitigating evidence. See id 
FN28. The amended statute remains the 
same today. SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4004 
("Punishment for murder. Subject to the 
provisions of 3 19-251 5, Idaho Code, 
every person guilty of murder of the first 
degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life."). 
As a result of the 1977 statutory changes, a 
capital defendant's conviction and imposition of 
the death sentence by the judge occur in two 
stages. First, Idaho must obtain a first degree 
murder conviction from the jury by proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed one of the crimes enumerated in 
Idaho Code 6 18-4003(a-Q.E Second, the jury 
having found the defendant guilty of first degree 
murder, the ,judge must hold a separate 
sentencing hearing. Based on the evidence 
presented at the hearing, the judge must: (1) find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of 
ten enumerated aggravating circumstances is 
present; and then (2) determine that the 
aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh($ any 
mitigating evidence. If the state fails to persuade 
the trial judge beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance, the 
defendant cannot be sentenced to death. Idaho 
Code 6 19-25151h). "Where a person is 
convicted of an offense which may be 
punishable by death, a sentence of death shall 
not be imposed unless the court finds at least 
one statutory aggravating circumstance." &&Q 
Code 6 19-2515(fl. 
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FN29. Idaho Code 6 18-4003 defines the 
following offenses as first degree 
murder: murder perpetrated by means of 
poison, lying in wait, torture; murder 
perpetrated by willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing; murder of any 
peace officer, executive officer, officer 
of the court, fireman, judicial officer or 
prosecuting attorney; murder committed 
by a person under a sentence for murder 
of the first or second degree; murder 
committed in the perpetration of or 
attempt to perpetrate, aggravated battery 
on a child under 12 years of age, arson, 
rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping or 
mayhem; any murder committed by a 
person incarcerated in a penal institution 
upon a person employed by the penal 
institution, another inmate of the penal 
institution or a visitor to the penal 
institution; any murder committed by a 
person while escaping or attempting to 
escape from a penal institution. Idaho 
Code 6 18-4003(a)-(Q. 
In accordance with its statutory scheme, Idaho 
charged Hoffman with first degree murder on 
the ground that the murder was perpetrated by 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. 
SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4003(a). The jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on the first degree murder 
charge. The trial judge then conducted a 
sentencing hearing without a jury, at which 
witnesses and the defendant testified. The judge 
found the presence of two statutory aggravating 
circumstances in Hoffman's case, determined 
that they outweighed the mitigating evidence, 
and imposed the death sentence. 
B. Appvendi v. New Jersey 
The Supreme Court in Apprendi considered a 
challenge to a New Jersey hate crime statute. 
The statute required the trial judge to determine 
at sentencing if the crime was motivated by "a 
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of 
individuals because of race, color, gender, 
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or 
ethnicity." Anpvendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351 (quoting 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 5 2C: 44-3(e) West Supp.2000). 
If the court made such a statutory finding, it 
could impose an "expanded" prison term. Id. 
The hate crime statute thus permitted the judge 
to impose an additional term of imprisonment 
beyond the maximum sentence prescribed for 
the offense for which the defendant was 
convicted. Id. 
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court 
characterized the hate crime enhancement as a 
"sentencing factor," the Supreme Court held that 
the enhancement "545 was an element of the 
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offense, which should have been considered by 
the jury. Id at 2353, 2363."" The Supreme 
Court concluded that all facts which increase the 
penalty beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be found by a jury to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt.? Id. at 2363 ("It 
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove 
from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.") (quoting 
Jones. 526 U.S. at 252-53, 119 S.Ct. 1215 
(Stevens, J. concurring)). 
FN30. Apprendi extended the Court's 
previous ruling in.Jones v. Unitedstates, 
526 U.S. 227. 119 S.Ct. 1215. 143 
L.Ed.2d 3 1 1 (1 999). In Jones, the Court 
held that the provisions of a federal car 
jacking statute that permitted the 
imposition of greater penalties are 
elements of the offense, and require a 
jury to determine the underlying facts. 
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. 119 S.Ct. 
1215. The Court found that a contrary 
interpretation would raise constitutional 
questions, because the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments require submission to the 
jury of facts that increase the punishment 
beyond that authorized by the statute. Id. 
at240-49. 119 S.Ct. 1215. 
FN31. The Supreme Court qualified this 
holding by declining to overrule 
Almendarez-Torres v. Unitedstates. 523 
U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 
350 (1998). Apprendi. 120 S.Ct. at2355. 
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme 
Court considered the statutory scheme 
for sentencing aliens once deported who 
return to the United States without 
permission. Although the general penalty 
for violating the applicable statute is two 
years of incarceration, the statute 
authorizes an additional prison term of 
up to twenty years for aliens who were 
removed subsequent to a felony 
conviction. Alrnendarez-Torres, 523 
U.S. at 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219. The 
Supreme Court found that the provision 
authorizing the additional prison term 
was a penalty provision, rather than a 
separate crime, and therefore concluded 
that the indictment did not need to list 
the prior conviction as an element of the 
offense. Id The Supreme Court 
described this holding as "at best, an 
exceptional departure." AD-prendi, 120 
S.Ct. at 2361. In Apprendi, the Court 
noted that "it is arguable that 
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly 
decided," and stressed the fact that the 
petitioner in Alrnendarez-Torres did not 
contest the underlying convictions. Id. 
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The Supreme Court provided clear instructions 
for distinguishing sentencing factors from 
elements of an offense: "the relevant inquiry is 
not one of form, but of effect-does the required 
finding expose the defendant to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury's 
guilty verdict?" Id. at 2365. The Court applied 
the test to the New Jersey hate crime statute, and 
found that the hate crime enhancement turned a 
second degree offense into a first degree offense. 
Id. 
Under Idaho's death penalty scheme, a defendant 
is not actually "death-eligible" after a jury 
convicts him of first degree rnurder.2 Rather, 
at the conclusion of the first degree murder 
conviction, the defendant is only eligible for a 
sentence of life imprisonment. Idaho Code 3 
19-2515(c). The defendant is not death-eligible 
until the trial judge finds the presence of an 
aggravating circumstance. Id. If the trial judge 
finds an aggravating circumstance, the judge 
then has the task of weighing the statutory 
aggravating circumstance against all of the 
mitigating evidence to determine if the 
defendant should receive life in prison or the 
death penalty. Id. 
FN32. As discussed earlier, the first 
degree murder conviction alone does not 
sufficiently guide the discretion of the 
sentencer to allow for the imposition of 
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the death penalty. See, e.g.,State v. 
Lindquisf; see also Woodson v. North 
Carolina. 428 U.S.  280. 303, 96 S.Ct. 
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)("North 
Carolina's mandatory death penalty 
statute provides no standards to guide 
the jury in its inevitable exercise of the 
power to determine which first-degree 
murderers shall live and which shall 
die.") 
Just as the presence of the hate crime 
enhancement transformed a second degree 
offense sentence into a first degree offense 
sentence under the New Jersey hate crime 
statute, the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance here transforms a life sentence into 
a potential death sentence under the Idaho death 
penalty scheme. There can be no doubt that a 
death sentence is "546 an increased penalty 
beyond life imprisonment. It is equally clear that 
the presence or absence of an aggravating 
circumstance is a factual determination. I would 
therefore conclude that the determination of the 
presence or absence of an aggravating 
circumstance in a capital case is a factual 
determination that increases the potential 
sentence from life imprisonment to capital 
punishment, and thus must be submitted to the 
jury under Apprendi. By allowing the judge to 
determine facts that increased the potential 
penalty from life imprisonment to death, &&Q 
Code 6 19-25 15 deprived Hoffman of his right 
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to a jury trial in violation of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
C. Walton v. Arizona 
The Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge 
to the trial judge's role in a state capital 
sentencing scheme in Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S.639.649,IlOS.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d511 
(1990')?U33 In Walton, the Court held 
constitutional a statutory scheme in Arizona that 
permitted the trial judge, rather than a jury, to 
find the presence of aggravating circumstances. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the 
presence of aggravating circumstances 
functioned as a necessary element of a death 
sentence and required a jury trial. See 
709. 110 S.Ct. 3047 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
FN33. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Walton because the Ninth 
Circuit ruled en banc in Adamson v. 
Ricketts, 865 F.2d 101 1 (19881, that the 
Ar izona  dea th  penalty was 
unconstitutional on the same grounds 
asserted by Walton. See Walton, 497 
U.S. at 647, 110 S.Ct. 3047. 
The Supreme Court in Apprendi was divided 
over whether Walton survives Apprendi. The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and 
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg, distinguished Walton from Apprendi. 
See Awrendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366. The majority 
opinion in Apprendi, referring to Walton, 
suggested that under the bifurcated Arizona 
scheme, the defendant was "death-eligible" once 
the jury found him guilty of first degree murder. 
Id. (describing Walton as holding that "once a 
jury has found the defendant guilty of all the 
elements of an offense which carries as its 
maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may 
be left to the judge to decide whether that 
maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, 
ought to  be imposed") (quoting 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257, n. 2, 118 
S.Ct. 1219. (Scalia, J. dissenting)). 
The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas 
acknowledged the tension between Walton and 
Apprendi, but found that it was "a question for 
another day." See id at 2380. 
Dissenting Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, 
Kennedy, and Breyer argued that Apprendi 
directly conflicts with Walton: 
The distinction of Walton offered by the Court 
today is baffling, to say the least. The key to 
that distinction is the Court's claim that, in 
Arizona, the jury maltes all of the findings 
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necessary to expose the defendant to a death 
sentence. As explained above, that claim is 
demonstrably untrue. A defendant convicted 
of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot 
receive a death sentence unless a judge makes 
the factual determination that a statutory 
aggravating factor exists. Without that critical 
finding, the maximum sentence to which the 
defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and 
not the death penalty. 
Id. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Thus, it appears that four justices considered 
Walton to survive Apprendi ,z  one *547 justice 
deferred the question, and four justices 
expressed the view that Apprendi overruled 
Walton. In the absence of a majority position 
about the continued viability of Walton, I turn 
for guidance to the Court's reasoning in 
Apprendi. 
Included in this count is Justice 
Stevens, the author of Apprendi. It is 
questionable, however, whether Justice 
Stevens considers Walton still good law, 
given his concurring opinion in Jones v. 
Unitedstates. In Jones, Justice Stevens 
explained that "in [his] view, a proper 
understanding of this principle [that it is 
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unconstitutional for a legislature to 
remove from the jury the assessment of 
facts that increase the prescribed range 
of penalties] encompasses ... facts that 
must be established before a defendant 
may be put to death." Jones. 526 U.S. 
at 253, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Justice Stevens 
continued, "[ilf ... the Court's opinion in 
Walton v. Arizona departed from that 
principle, as I think [it] did, [it] should 
be reconsidered in due course." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
The reasoning of Apprendi, that any assessment 
of facts that increases the maximum penalty 
must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, persuades me that a jury 
must find the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before 
a death sentence can be inflicted upon a 
defendant convicted of first degree murder under 
Idaho's bifurcated statutory scheme. 
D. The Teague Non-Retroactivity Exception 
for Watershed Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Apprendi, and its precursor, Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227. 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 
L.Ed.2d 3 11 (19991, were both decided after 
Hoffman's conviction became final. Under 
Teague, Hoffman, as a petitioner in a federal 
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habeas proceeding, cannot receive the benefit of 
a new rule of law unless the rule falls within one 
of two exceptions. The requirement that the jury 
rather than the trial judge determine the presence 
of a statutoty aggravating factor in a capital case 
before a death sentence can be imposed is a new 
rule of law which cannot be applied to this case 
unless the rule falls within one of the two 
Teague exceptions. 
The Supreme Court in Teague recognized an 
exception, frequently referred to as the "second 
exception," relevant in this case, for "those 
watershed rules of criminal procedure" that 
"alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of 
a proceeding." Sawver v. Smith. 497 U.S. 227, 
242, 1 I0 S.Ct. 2822. 1 1 1 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) 
(quoting Teague )!E Thus, the question in 
Hoffman's case is whether extending Apprendi 
to the determination of an aggravating 
circumstance in a death penalty case constitutes 
a fundamental rule of criminal procedure 
sufficient to satisf) the second exception. 
FN35. The Court described two 
categorical exceptions in Teague: (1) 
rules that place primary individual 
conduct outside of the power of criminal 
law to proscribe, and (2) watershed rules 
of criminal procedure. Teame, 489 
U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The 
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"watershed rules of criminal procedure" 
is thus sometimes referred to as the 
"second exception" to Teague. 
Since the Supreme Court decided Teague a 
decade ago, federal courts have struggled to 
discern the meaning of this second exception. 
See Saffle v. Parks. 494 U.S. 484.495.110 S.Ct. 
1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) ("[Tlhe precise 
contours of this exception may be difficult to 
discern."); Gaines v. Kellv, 202 F.3d 598. 604 
(2d Cir.20001 (describing the scope of the 
second exception as a "difficult question" 
unaided by the "relatively sparse guidance" of 
the Supreme Court). Despite ambiguity over the 
definition, courts have applied the second 
exception to a range of constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure. See, ee.g., Ostroskv v. 
Alaska, 913 F.2d 590. 594-95 (9th Cir.19901 
(announcing a new due process rule concerning 
mistake of law defenses and finding that the rule 
- 
falls within the Teague exception for 
"procedures implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty"); Hall v. Kelso. 892.F.2d 1541, 1543 n. 
1 (1 1 th Cir.1990) (finding as an exception the 
rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana 
regarding burden shifting instructions); Graham 
v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 994 (2d Cir.1991) 
(finding as an exception the rule announced in 
Cruz, that non testifying codefendant's 
confession may not be admitted); Williams v. 
Dixon. 961 F.2d 448. 454-56 (4th Cir.1992) 
(finding as an exception the Mills rule striking 
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the unanimity requirement in jury findings of 
mitigating evidence); *548Gaines. 202 F.3d at 
604 (finding as an exception the Cage rule that 
-
describing reasonable doubt in terms of grave or 
substantial uncertainty and requiring a "moral 
certainty" violates due process). 
I would find that the issue at stake in this 
case-the right to have ajury determine facts that 
increase the potential penalty from life 
imprisonment to death-is the kind of 
fundamental rule of criminal procedure that 
should be applied retroactively under the second 
Teague exception. The Supreme Court 
announced in Apprendi that "[alt stalte in this 
case are constitutional protections of surpassing 
importance." Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2355. The 
Court characterized the right to a jury trial of 
every element of the offense and the standard of 
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, as "basic 
principles" of our legal system, noting 
there is a vast difference between accepting 
the validity of a prior judgment of conviction 
entered in aproceeding in which the defendant 
had the right to a jury trial and the right to 
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to 
find the required fact under a lesser standard 
of proof. 
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I would adhere to the Supreme Court's 
characterization of the rule at stake in Apprendi 
and find that the right to a jury determination of 
an element of capital murder, the presence of an 
aggravating circumstance, is a "bedrock right" 
within the meaning of the second Teague 
exception. I would thus apply the rule 
announced in Apprendi to Hoffman's case and 
find that he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process right to a jury trial 
when the trial judge, rather than the jury, found 
the presence of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, necessary to the impositionofthe 
death penalty. 
E. Harmless Error 
Although I conclude that Idaho Statute 2 
19-25 15 unconstitutionally requires the judge 
rather than the jury to find the presence of 
aggravating circumstances, the error appears 
harmless in Hoffman's case. See Satterwhite, 
486 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 1792. The error is 
harmless unless the trial judge's determination of 
the presence of the aggravating circumstance 
had a "substantial and injurious effect" on 
Hoffman's sentence. See Bains, 204 F.3d at 
964. 
-
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The trial judge found that the aggravating 
circumstance, that the victim was a witness or a 
potential witness in a legal proceeding, was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point 
during the trial, sentencing proceeding, or appeal 
process has Hoffman contested that the victim 
was a witness or potential witness. 
Given the fact that there is no dispute that the 
aggravating circumstance was present, I would 
not find that Hoffman's sentence was adversely 
affected by the fact that the trial judge, rather 
than the jury, made this determination. 
Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial 
judge's determination of the presence of the 
aggravating circumstance in this case is 
harmless error. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART 
AND REMANDED. 
C.A.9 (Idaho),2001. 
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